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A Bilevel Approach for Optimal Price-Setting of
Time-and-Level-of-Use Tariffs
Mathieu Besançon, Miguel F. Anjos Senior Member, IEEE,, Luce Brotcorne, Juan A. Gómez-Herrera
Abstract—The Time-and-Level-of-Use (TLOU) system is a re-
cently developed approach for electric energy pricing, extending
Time-of-Use with an energy capacity that customers can book
in advance for a given consumption time. We define a bilevel
optimization model for determining the pricing parameters of
TLOU, maximizing the supplier revenue while anticipating an
optimal reaction of the customer. A solution approach is built,
based on the discrete finite set of optimality candidates of the
lower-level customer problem.
Index Terms—Demand response, electricity pricing, bilevel
optimization, Time-and-Level-of-Use (TLOU)
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing proportion of solar and wind generation
in the energy mix, power systems have to accommodate greater
variability on the supply side, along with more complex
decisions on the demand side with generation and storage
units down to the residential level. Demand Response (DR)
has been seen as one of the promising approaches to these
challenges, leveraging customers’ flexibility to provide ser-
vices for better operation of power systems. DR programs
are often classified as incentive-based or price-based programs
[2]. Different price-based programs are compared in [3] from
the perspective of a supplier designing the pricing program,
anticipating in a bilevel framework the reaction of a pro-
sumer with storage and shifting capacity. A detailed review
of the literature on bilevel optimization for price-based DR
is available in [1]. Incentive-based programs require more
commitment from the demand side, thus are often less suitable
for targeting residential customers. Price-based DR requires
less commitment and constraints on the customer side, thus
offering a greater flexibility, but does not provide the supplier
with strong guarantees on the actual or even expected demand.
An approach taken in price-based DR is to offer varying
reliability of electricity to customers [4], leaving the supplier
free to adapt the power effectively served to the customer. The
insufficiency of short-term estimation methods was identified
in a technical report [5] as as one of the critical barriers to
the effective implementation of DR. Even though Time-and-
Level-of-Use (TLOU) is more related to price-based DR, the
self-determined capacity creates an incentive for respecting the
upper bound on the consumption on the part of the customer.
It was defined in [6] as an extension of the Time-of-Use
(TOU) pricing scheme, targeting specifically the issue with
current large-scale DR programs identified in the FERC report
[5]. Specifically, in the TLOU context, TOU is just a special
This work was presented at the 13th EUROGEN conference on Evolution-
ary and Deterministic Computing for Industrial Applications [1].
setting with a null booked capacity. The authors of [6] develop
the optimal planning and operation of a smart building under
TLOU pricing. In this work, we propose a bilevel optimization
model to assist in determining the optimal TLOU pricing
structure for a supplier.
The reaction of the customer to the proposed pricing is
integrated in the supplier decision problem, thus turning the
customer-supplier interaction into a Stackelberg game solved
as a bilevel optimization problem. Using specific properties of
the customer problem, the optimal capacity decision can be
reduced from a continuous set to a discrete finite number of
choices which can be computed independently of other deci-
sions. Through this transformation, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for lower-level optimality are expressed as a set
of linear constraints. For each time frame and corresponding
consumption distribution, the set of optimal pricing options
can be computed as solutions to the bilevel problem with fixed
lower level. These options can be computed in advance, and
one can be selected by the supplier ahead of the consumption
time to create an incentive for the customer to book and
consume a given capacity.
The contributions of this letter are the following: developing
further the conceptual basis of the TLOU pricing and some of
its key properties, building a bilevel model for the supplier’s
problem and a specialized solution method, and highlighting
through numerical experiments the ability of TLOU to create
different incentives depending on the supplier’s needs.
This letter is structured as follows. Section II introduces
the TLOU pricing, along with the variant used in this work.
In Section III, the model of the supplier decision problem
is developed, and necessary optimality conditions are defined
to design an efficient solution method. Computational experi-
ments are presented in Section IV for a supplier offering prices
to incentivize the customer to follow a certain capacity profile
across the day. Section V concludes the work.
II. TLOU PRICING
The TLOU policy extends TOU by allowing a customer
to book an energy capacity that they self-determine at each
time frame depending on their planned requirements. Through
this mechanism, they provide the supplier with information
on the energy they would possibly consume. The capacity is
the energy booked by the customer for a given time frame,
following the same terminology as the initial description of
TLOU in [6]. As in TOU, the price of energy depends on the
time frame within the day, but also on the capacity booked by
the customer. TLOU is applied in a three-phase process:
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1) The supplier sends the pricing information
(K,πL(c), πH(c)) to the customer.
2) The customer books a capacity from the supplier for the
time frame before a given deadline.
3) After the time frame, the energy cost is computed de-
pending on the energy consumed xt and booked capacity
ct:
• If xt ≤ ct, then the applied price of energy is πL(ct)
and the energy cost is πL(ct) · xt.
• If xt > ct, then the applied price of energy is
πH(ct) and the energy cost is πH(ct) · xt.
The first step corresponds to the pricing decision of the
supplier for a given time frame. They then send the pricing
to the customer, who takes in a second time their decision by
booking a capacity ct ≥ 0, minimizing their expected cost.
The pricing system is described by three elements: a booking
fee K, a step-wise decreasing function πL(ct) representing the
lower energy price and a step-wise increasing function πH(ct)
representing the higher energy price. πL(ct) will refer to the
function of the capacity and πLj to the value of the lower price
at step j.
An important feature of this DR program is the minimal
information that must be exchanged by the parties involved.
Unlike DR programs which require users to provide their
projected needs or delegate the scheduling decisions to the
supplier, TLOU only requires a capacity from the user, with
the option of falling back on TOU pricing by not booking a
capacity for any time frame.
We use the TLOU definition presented in [1]. Unlike the
original convention of [6], the totality of the energy consumed
is paid at the lower tariff if it remains below the booked
capacity, and at the higher tariff otherwise, as described in
Equation (1). In other words, if the consumption over the time
frame remains below the booked capacity, the effective energy
price is given by the lower tariff curve; if the consumption
exceeds the booked capacity, the energy price is given by the
higher tariff. This asymmetry in the pricing system creates a
strong incentive to make the capacity act as an upper bound
on the consumption, while under-consumption is penalized
by a soft term proportional with the deviation as highlighted
in Figure 2. Customers are still able to consume above the
capacity if necessary, and the supplier is compensated for
this deviation by the higher price that applies. The total cost
for the customer associated with a booked capacity c and a
consumption Xt for a time frame t is:
C(ct;Xt) =
{
K · ct + πL(ct) ·Xt, ifXt ≤ ct,
K · ct + πH(ct) ·Xt otherwise.
(1)
In the rest of this letter, the index of the considered time frame
is dropped when not necessary in an expression to keep the
notation succinct.
Proposition II.1. If a customer books a capacity c > 0 for
a given time frame and assuming K + πL(c) < πH(c), the
lowest cost per kW · h is reached when the consumption is
exactly equal to the booked capacity.
Proof. If X ≤ c, the total cost is given by Kc + XπL(c),
hence the relative cost per consumed unit of energy is KcX +
πL(c), which is strictly decreasing with X . The discontinuity
at X = c is positive, since the relative total cost changes from
Kc
X + π
L(c) to KcX + π
H(c). The relative cost at X = c is
K+πL(c), assuming K+πL(c) < πH(c), there is no decrease
of the relative cost below the point it reaches at c = X .
An example illustrating Proposition II.1 is given Figure 1
and 2.
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Figure 1. Example of TLOU pricing


























Figure 2. Relative cost of energy vs consumption for different
capacities
One property of interest derived from Proposition II.1 is that
the customer does not have any incentive to signal a capacity
different from their consumption intent. This is in particular
valuable for consuming units which are able to adjust their
consumption through storage or flexible loads.
Another property of the proposed pricing is that the cus-
tomer does not need to explicitly signal to the supplier that
they do not wish to participate in TLOU at some given time
frame. A customer can opt-out of the program simply by
booking a capacity c = 0, for which the applied pricing
matches TOU.
In a realistic setting, the supplier will have multiple, po-
tentially heterogeneous customers. The model presented here
tackles the single-customer case, but also applies when the
supplier is able to offer different price settings specific to each
individual customer.
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III. BILEVEL MODEL FOR THE SUPPLIER DECISION
In this section, we present a mathematical optimization
problem modeling the supplier decision when setting the
parameters of the TLOU pricing. The sequential decision
process, with one agent reacting to the decision of the other
and taking it into account when solving their decision problem,
is represented as a Stackelberg game, and can be modeled as
a bilevel optimization problem. In this bilevel formulation,
the upper-level represents the energy supplier deciding on
the pricing components (K,πL, πH), while the lower-level
represents the customer’s response to the supplier’s decision,
in terms of booking a capacity c.
We consider the consumption of the customer to be un-
known to both the supplier and themselves when taking both
the pricing and the booking decision. Both players know the
probability distribution of this consumption ahead of time
before making their decision. This probability distribution is
assumed to be discrete and its support Ω is a finite set, with
each element representing a consumption scenario ω ∈ Ω,
with associated probability and value pω , xω respectively. The
probability distribution and its support likely depend on the
time frame considered t, we note it Ωt when the time frame
is specified. The expected cost of the customer, which is
equivalent to the expected revenue of the supplier, is given
as a function of both capacity and pricing:









with any capacity booked defining a partition of the set of
scenarios:
Ω−(c) = {ω ∈ Ω, xω ≤ c} & Ω+(c) = {ω ∈ Ω, xω > c}.
(3)
[1, Proposition 3.1] defines the subset of capacities respecting
the necessary optimality conditions:
St = {0} ∪ CL ∪ Ωt (4)
where the steps of the lower and higher price functions are
given at different breakpoints:
{cL0 , cL1 , cL2 , ...} = CL & {πL0 , πL1 , πL2 , ...} = πL
{cH0 , cH1 , cH2 , ...} = CH & {πH0 , πH1 , πH2 , ...} = πH
The customer books the cost-minimizing capacity at each time
frame, given the corresponding probability distribution. With
the finite set of optimal candidates St, this constraint can be
re-written as:
C(ct) ≤ C(c) ∀c ∈ St, (5)
which corresponds to finitely many linear constraints. If mul-
tiple values of c reach a minimum cost, there is no unique
choice the supplier can anticipate from the customer. In such
situation, the supplier cannot correctly foresee the decision of
the customer. They would want to ensure that the preferred
solution of the customer is unique, by making one solution
strictly lower in cost than all other capacity candidates. We
re-formulate this requirement as the cost being lower than
that of any other solution by at least a quantity δ > 0.
This quantity can be interpreted as the conservativeness of
the customer (unwillingness to move to an optimal solution
up to a difference of δ). It is a parameter of the decision-
making process of the supplier, estimated a priori by the
supplier based on its risk aversion and estimation of customer
reactivity. Given this conservativeness parameter, the lower-
level optimality conditions of a candidate k ∈ St for a time
frame t become:
C(ctk,K, πL, πH) ≤ C(ctl,K, πL, πH)−δ ∀l ∈ St\{k}. (6)
Given that the special case c = 0 matches the TOU pricing,
the net difference in expected cost of δ is also ensuring that the
effort of the customer committing to a capacity and engaging
in the program should not be expected by the supplier below
a net gain of δ for the customer.
The space of price parameters can be further restricted
to include regularity constraints on the pricing curves, lower
and upper bounds on the prices. All these constraints can be
expressed as linear inequalities, and are summarized with the
notation:
(K,πL, πH) ∈ Φ (7)
For each capacity candidate k ∈ St\{0}, the supplier finds
the optimal pricing parameters such that the candidate is the
optimal capacity to book for the customer, and is at least better
than any other candidate by a difference of δ. The kth price-
setting problem is expressed as:
max
K,πL,πH
C(ctk,K, πL, πH) (8a)
(K,πL, πH) ∈ Φ (8b)
C(ctk,K, πL, πH) ≤ C(clt,K, πL, πH)− δ ∀l ∈ St\k,
(8c)
where C(ctk,K, πL, πH) is defined in Equation (2). In [1], a
multi-objective version of the same model is developed, the
second objective is experimentally found to be non-conflicting
with the revenue maximization.
Formulation (8) fully captures the bilevel nature of the
problem through Constraint (8c), which specifies that the
specific k-th capacity candidate must be the optimal choice
by at least δ for the customer (lower level). Given the discrete
nature of the lower- level decision (choosing the lowest-cost
capacity candidate among a discrete set), the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker primal-dual optimality conditions could not be used.
Constraint (8c) is used as an optimality condition for the lower-
level, leveraging the fact that the optimality candidates can all
be known prior to the optimization phase.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the setup and results for exper-
iments with a supplier setting a TLOU pricing for 24 time
frames, picking the pricing minimizing the deviation from
the hourly. The data used and further experimentation are
presented in [1, Section IV].
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Figure 3. Booked capacity profile and load distribution bounds
Given the probability distribution of the consumption at each
time frame, the supplier can construct a TLOU price setting
for each capacity candidate by solving problem 8. Once these
hourly options have been computed, the supplier can choose
to create an incentive for the customer to follow a profile. To
avoid unexpected deviations, the supplier can set the prices, as
to have a non-zero capacity as close as possible to the average
consumption of each time frame, as shown in Figure 3. We
use a δ = $0.005 and similar settings as [1, Section IV] for
other parameters (with a reference TOU price of $1.0).
Alternatively, a major objective of many DR programs is to
smooth the demand curve by peak shaving and valley filling.
The sum of variations from one time frame to the next can be




























t ∀ t ∈ {1..|T | − 1}
(9c)∑
k∈St
zkt = 1 ∀t ∈ T (9d)
In this model, zkt = 1 is equivalent to the supplier choosing
the kth candidate for the time frame t. vt takes as value the
absolute error between the capacity at t and t+1. The optimum
of this model corresponds to a constant booked capacity over
all the time frames. A trade-off can be set between this







t / |T |. (10)
Different solutions corresponding to various trade-off are
obtained by solving problem (11) with a weight w varying
as shown in Figure 4. The weight parameter is the weight
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Figure 4. Booked capacity profile with the weighted bi-objective model
assigned to the average booked capacity, while the weight of












t / |T | (11a)
s.t (9b− 9d) (11b)
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we present a bilevel model for a supplier
optimizing the TLOU pricing, selecting for each capacity
candidate the revenue-maximizing price setting. We illustrate
the application with a selection of capacities across the day to
smooth the capacity curve or to stay close to the average, and
thus create an incentive for the customer to consume at this
level. Future research will consider a single setting for multiple
customers and exploiting continuous probability distributions
of the consumption.
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